The Self: An Artificial and Complicated Non-Truth

Jaques Lacan and Friedrich Nietzche explore the development of the self-concept and self-identification as artificial and abstract processes. Lacan in “The Mirror Stage” states that when a child sees, identifies, and holds their image in the mirror for the first time, they develop an image of themselves and how they think others will perceive them. Nietzche complicates this argument in “On Truth and Lying in a Non-Moral Sense” by arguing that often our prejudice in our morals get in the way of how we see what the truth is. We intuitively label things that are true as good, however, what we decide to be good is actually just what is most beneficial for us. So, what we perceive to be true, is not necessarily the truth as it is in nature. This paper argues that whilst humans have a unique artificial supplement in our development process allowing us to form a self-image and eventually a self-concept which becomes the foundation for socialization, it is an abstract process limited by the deception set forth by our cognition to blind us from whole truths and ensure our survival. Therefore, who we perceive to be ourselves and the fragmented components that make up our self-image is not necessarily how it is in nature.

Lacan explains the process of seeing ourselves for the first time as an unoriginal product of the mirror stage. He states that a transformation takes place when the child assumes an image for the first time after standing before a mirror and taking in all the components that make him an organised whole being (Lacan 2). Without this stage, we are a “fragmented body,” a collection of limbs that do not have a sense of cohesion or natural completeness (5). The ability to therefore create an image of ourselves is a product of this artificial stage which places a child before a mirror. It is not innate or present in nature, and it persists throughout life. This image is a representation of the child’s control over their own image reflected on the mirror. However, it is an imaginary form of self-mastery over their being because it is not their actual body, and there is no other way for them to contest it. The moment when they first see themselves is a scene of fascination where they put together the puzzle pieces of their bodies which begins the process of forming their ego (i.e. their personal identity and self-concept). This is a premature and fictional conceptualisation because “the ego is the effect of images; it is, in short, an imaginary function” (Homer 25). In order for the child to perceive how others will interact with and perceive them, this imaginary process must take place because it gives the child agency. So, Lacan establishes a sequential process of self-conceptualisation and self-identification. Firstly, they must see themselves in their entirety, then begin the formation of their ego based on how they perceive their image, and ultimately use it during socialisation.

This image can create a form of misrecognition or a “lack to be” as Lacan describes it. What the child imagines other people to see themself as is always the image that they created. It is a misrecognition rather than a recognition because the child can only see the image, and not themselves as their true self. The child is trapped in others’ gaze where “the I is precipitated in a primordial form, before it is objectified in the dialectic of identification with the other” (Lacan 2). Consequently, this leads to a “lack to be” whereby “in the spatial capitation manifested in the mirror stage, even before the social dialect, the effect in man of an organic insufficiency in his natural reality,” so, the subject (i.e. the child) can never truly be transparent about what makes up their being (4). Therefore, the idealised self-mastery of our image as mentioned before, also known as our ego-ideal, is a necessary tool for overcoming this insufficiency and “lack to be.” It stands by as a support system for the self because it tames the inadequacy of their images’ subjectivity, and helps in the creation of a complete and rounded self-identity.

Nietzche further complicates Lacan’s notion of the “lack to be” by questioning what humans associate as true to begin with. The formation of the self and the importance we give to it makes us believe that we are the centre of the world. Nietzche provides a reality-check on our sense of superiority in relation to the world by putting into perspective our temporal insignificance in planetary history calling it “the most arrogant and most mendacious minute in the history of the world” (141). We value our intellect, our cognition so much because we believe it to be our product, an innate and original product of our existence. However, there are many things in nature that we simply cannot perceive because of our limited cognition, such as variants of light and sound. This makes our conception of the world just ours, not an actual true conception. This can be extended to the conception of the self. If our conception of the self is an imaginary creation of an image which both the individual and others use to perceive, then as Lacan stated, we do not know how we truly exist in nature because there is no other way to verify ourselves.

Moreover, Nietzche identifies our cognition’s ability to deceive and disguise as a necessary tool to ensure our survival by simplifying the world. He states that “the intellect shows its greatest strengths in dissimulation (deceit and disguise)” leading to us misconstruing deception as truth, not allowing humanity to truly look deeply into itself (142). And so, we can never be fully transparent about ourselves and begin to see ourselves through self-aggrandizing concepts to overcome the “lack to be.” If humans were to know every minute detail of nature or ourselves, it would overwhelm the cognition and have detrimental effects on our survival because humans only “desire the pleasant, life-preserving consequences of the truth;... they are actually hostile towards truth which may be harmful and destructive” (143). We neglect the truths which disturb us. This contributes to the formation of the self as well. When creating the image of ourself, there is no sure way to tell whether our image is a true amalgamation of all the components that make up ourself, or whether it is the non-destructive features we acknowledge and want to make accessible for others to perceive. On the one hand, this revelation complicates our understanding of the self and destroys the narcissism present in our perception of ourselves. On the other hand, because the implications of this revelation would lead to a spiralling descent into questioning everything we perceive, a certain amount of self-aggrandizing is needed to survive; just as Lacan stated, the ego acts as a crutch for the self.

Lacan’s argument about the formation and confidence of the self contains one particular unaddressed issue. Lacan’s mirror stage seemingly depends on a purely visual formation of the self. Visually impaired individuals never reach the mirror stage detailed in Lacan’s text, their self-concept stems from others’ providing their perceptions of the individual to them. They cannot form an image because they have no experience in creating visual cues. Does this mean that they do not have a self-image at all? The exclusion of this group does not invalidate Lacan’s or Nietzche’s arguments, because the notion of a “lack to be” and the deception of the cognition holds whether an individual is sensorily impaired or not. However, addressing how this argument may extend to sensorily impaired individuals can potentially add further insights into the formation of the self.

How we perceive ourselves is not necessarily how we are in nature. How animals or insects interact with us are witness to this notion. If we as humans were to question our existence and our image at every moment, we would never be able to accomplish the tasks necessary for our wellbeing and rather be consumed by trying to find transparency. Therefore, although the self-image may be an artificial supplemental creation, and the ego-ideal is self-aggrandizing, both are required for us to survive, socialise, and interact with nature, no matter how limited that experience may be.

Disclaimer: This work is original and the property of Aroni Sarkar. It is not authorised for any use, copies or dissemination.

Works Consulted

Homer, Sean. Jacques Lacan. New York, Routledge, 2005.

Lacan, Jaques. “The Mirror Stage as Formative of the Function of the I As Revealed In

Psychoanalytic Experience.” Écrits: A Selection, translated by Alan Sheridan, Tavistock Publications, 1977, pp1-8.

Nietzche, Friedrich. “On Truth and Lying in a Non-Moral Sense.” The Birth of Tragedies and Other Writings. Translated by Ronald Speirs, Cambridge University Press, 1999.